read.........

Actuary "Ezekial 25:17 - The path of the righteous man is beset on all sides by the inequites of the selfish and the tyranny of evil men. Blessed is he that shepherds the weak from the valley of darkness for he is truly his brother's keeper, and the finder of lost children. And I will strike down upon thee with great vengeance and furious anger those who attempt to poison and destroy my brothers, and you will know my name is the Lord when I lay my vengeance upon thee."



FindaCase Network


[U] Conyers v. State

COURT OF APPEALS THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS CORPUS CHRISTI - EDINBURG

Docket Number available at www.versuslaw.com
Citation Number available at www.versuslaw.com

May 25, 2006

DONNIE CONYERS, APPELLANT,
v.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE.

On appeal from the 319th District Court of Nueces County, Texas.

The opinion of the court was delivered by: Justice Yañez

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before Justices Hinojosa, Yañez, and Garza.

By nine issues, appellant pro se Donnie Conyers challenges his conviction for aggravated assault*fn1 after a jury found him guilty and the trial court assessed punishment at fifteen years confinement. Specifically, appellant contends (1) the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support his conviction (issues one and two), (2) the trial court erred in denying his motion for directed verdict (issue three), (3) the trial court erred in admitting the knife allegedly used by appellant (issue four), (4) the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support the jury's deadly weapon finding (issue five), (5) the prosecutor engaged in prosecutorial misconduct (issues six and seven), (6) the trial court erred in admitting his pen-packet because it was not properly authenticated (issue eight), and (7) the trial court erred by overruling his Batson challenge (issue nine).*fn2 We affirm.

Applicable Law

The penal code provides in pertinent part:

§ 22.02 Aggravated Assault

(a) A person commits an offense if the person commits assault as defined in § 22.01 and the person:

(1) causes serious bodily injury*fn3 to another, including the person's spouse; or

(2) uses or exhibits a deadly weapon*fn4 during the commission of the assault.*fn5

Legal and Factual Sufficiency

Claims of legal insufficiency of evidence are reviewed by examining the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and determining whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.*fn6

We measure the legal sufficiency of the evidence against the elements of the offense as defined by a hypothetically correct jury charge for the case.*fn7 "Such a charge would be one that accurately sets out the law, is authorized by the indictment, does not unnecessarily increase the State's burden of proof or unnecessarily restrict the State's theories of liability, and adequately describes the particular offense for which the defendant was tried."*fn8

The jury, as the trier of fact, may use common sense and apply common knowledge, observation, and experience gained in ordinary affairs when giving effect to the inferences that may be reasonably drawn from the evidence.*fn9 As fact finder, the jury is the exclusive judge of the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be afforded their testimony.*fn10 The jury is free to accept one version of the facts, reject another, or reject all or any of a witness's testimony.*fn11

In a factual sufficiency review, we view all of the evidence in a neutral light, and we will set the verdict aside only if the evidence is so weak that the verdict is clearly wrong and manifestly unjust, or the contrary evidence is so strong that the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt could not have been met.*fn12 We are not bound to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, and may consider the testimony of all the witnesses.*fn13

Disagreeing with the fact finder's determination is appropriate only when the record clearly indicates that such a step is necessary to arrest the occurrence of a manifest injustice; otherwise, due deference must be accorded the fact finder's determinations, particularly those concerning the weight and credibility of the evidence.*fn14 A proper factual sufficiency review must consider the most important evidence that the appellant claims undermines the jury's verdict.*fn15

Analysis

By his first two issues, appellant challenges the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction. By issue three, appellant contends the trial court erred in denying his motion for directed verdict.*fn16

Specifically, appellant argues that the evidence presented at trial, including the location of the victim's wounds, shows a "possibility" that the wounds "were self-inflicted." Appellant argues that the jury "was not given the opportunity to adequately entertain the reasonable alternate hypothesis" that the victim stabbed and strangled herself to ensure that appellant would be sent to prison, thereby depriving him of custody of his children. According to appellant, the evidence is factually insufficient because the victim's testimony "could not prove that her injuries were not self-inflicted."

In his fifth issue, appellant contends the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support the jury's finding that the knife used in the assault was a deadly weapon. Appellant argues the evidence is insufficient because he contends the victim's wounds were self-inflicted.

At trial, the victim, appellant's wife, testified that he stabbed her in the back and chest, choked her, and continually threatened her life. She testified that this episode did not end until he saw blood on her shirt, at which time he allowed her to go to a hospital. The victim's treating physician, a trauma surgeon, testified that the four-to-six centimeter stab wounds in her back and chest and the bruises on her neck from strangulation, while not resulting in life-threatening injury, were potentially fatal because of the close proximity to the spinal column and heart. This physician and the county medical examiner, both aware of the legal definition of "deadly weapon," also expressed the opinion that the blade of the knife, while only five centimeters long, was used or intended to be used as a deadly weapon. These doctors further testified that human hands could cause serious bodily injury or death if used to strangle someone.*fn17

Appellant presented no witnesses or evidence at trial. During closing argument, his attorney suggested that the "real issue" in the case was "whether or not [appellant] attacked [the victim] at all." However, no evidence was presented at trial in support of appellant's hypothesis that the victim's wounds were self-inflicted. The trial court correctly instructed the jury that the arguments of the attorneys were not to be considered as evidence.*fn18

After reviewing this record in a light most favorable to the verdict, we hold that the evidence was legally sufficient to support the conviction. Likewise, viewing the evidence in a neutral light, we hold that the evidence was factually sufficient to support the verdict. A rational juror could have found the "serious bodily injury" element, as there was evidence of the victim's substantial risk of death or protracted loss or impairment of the function of her bodily members or organs.*fn19 A rational juror could have also found that the appellant's knife and hands were used or intended to be used as deadly weapons, based on the victim's testimony and the doctors' opinions.*fn20 We also conclude that proof of appellant's guilt and the deadly weapon finding is not so obviously weak as to undermine confidence in the jury's determination, nor is it greatly outweighed by contrary proof.*fn21 We overrule appellant's first, second, third, and fifth issues.

In his fourth issue, appellant contends the trial court erred in admitting the knife into evidence because its probative value was greatly outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.*fn22 However, appellant's counsel stated that he had "no objection" to admitting the knife into evidence. Thus, appellant has failed to preserve any issue for our review.*fn23 We overrule appellant's fourth issue.

In his sixth and seventh issues, appellant argues that the prosecutor engaged in "prosecutorial misconduct." Specifically, appellant complains that at the punishment phase of trial, on cross-examination of a witness for appellant, the prosecutor asked the witness the following two questions: (1) "Were you aware that he broke his second wife's jaw?" and (2) "Were you aware that he kidnapped his children for one year and hid out from his first wife?"*fn24 The record reflects that no objection was raised to the questions. Accordingly, appellant has failed to preserve any issue for review.*fn25 We overrule appellant's sixth and seventh issues.

In his eighth issue, appellant contends the trial court erred during the punishment phase of the trial by admitting evidence that was not properly authenticated. Specifically, appellant complains that the court erred in admitting a pen-packet that was not properly authenticated. At trial, appellant objected to admission of the pen-packet under Texas Rules of Evidence 902(1) and 902(2).*fn26 On appeal, however, appellant complains that the pen-packet was "not properly authenticated under Rule 902.4 [sic] Texas Rules of Evidence." Because appellant's contention on appeal is different from his trial objection, he has waived any alleged error.*fn27

In his brief, appellant also complains of the admission of State's Exhibits 3 and 4, contending these exhibits were not properly authenticated under Rule 902(4). At trial, appellant objected to "page 2 of Exhibit No. 3" and Exhibit 4 as "not authenticated." Assuming, without deciding, that appellant preserved the issue, we conclude that any error in the admission of Exhibits 3 and 4 was harmless. Exhibits 3 and 4 are copies of documents on file with the Sacramento Superior Court reflecting appellant's prior convictions for drug possession and trafficking. The victim testified, without objection, to the same facts that the documents reflect: that appellant was convicted of heroin possession in California, extradited from California to Florida, and convicted of conspiracy to traffic cocaine and trafficking cocaine in Florida. It is a settled rule that any error in admission of evidence is cured by admission of the same evidence elsewhere without objection.*fn28 We overrule appellant's eighth issue.

In his ninth issue, appellant complains that the trial court erred by overruling his Batson challenge. Appellant argues that (1) the State's strikes were gender-oriented, in that eight of its ten strikes were against men and (2) "[t]he group of former jurors that had voted not guilty in other criminal cases were systematically excluded by the state which deprived the defendant due process guaranteed him under the law."

Improper strikes based on gender are treated equally at law as strikes based on race; both are universally disapproved for identical reasons.*fn29 When reviewing a Batson challenge, we examine the record in the light most favorable to the trial judge's ruling and reverse only when the ruling is clearly erroneous.*fn30 A ruling is clearly erroneous when, after searching the record, we are left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.*fn31 If the trial judge's ruling is supported by the record, including the voir dire, the prosecutor's explanation of her peremptory challenges, appellant's rebuttal, and any impeaching evidence, then the ruling is not clearly erroneous.*fn32

A Batson challenge generally gives rise to a three-step process.*fn33 First, the defendant must make a prima facie case that a venire member was peremptorily excluded on the basis of race or gender.*fn34 Next, the prosecution must come forward with race or gender-neutral reasons for the peremptory strike.*fn35 A neutral explanation in this context means an explanation that is merely based on something other than the race or gender of the juror.*fn36 Finally, the defendant has the opportunity to rebut the State's explanations.*fn37 The burden of persuasion remains with the defendant to prove purposeful discrimination.*fn38 It is in judging the trial court's decision at step three that the "clearly erroneous" standard of appellate review is applied.*fn39 In Purkett v. Elem, the United States Supreme Court explained that "unless a discriminatory intent is inherent in the prosecutor's explanation, the reason offered will be deemed race neutral."*fn40

Here, the prosecutor explained why the State had exercised each of its ten strikes.*fn41

Following the State's explanation, the following exchange occurred:

Q: [Defense counsel]: Okay. And your purpose in exercising- the fact that more than a proportional number of males were struck, it's your testimony that that was just a coincidence?

A: [State]: Yes. Absolutely.

Q: [Defense counsel]: Pass the witness.

[Court]: Okay. Anything else?

[State]: No Your Honor.

[Court]: All right. Anything else, [counsel]?

[Defense counsel]: Just, we add an additional challenge, Your Honor, that the group of jurors- former jurors that have voted not guilty in criminal cases were systematically excluded by the exercise of preemptory [sic] challenges by the State which deprives the defendant of due process under the 14th amendment.

[Court]: All right. Of anything else?

[State]: No, Your Honor.

[Court]: All right. And your Batson challenge is denied, and we'll proceed with the trial. And I will see you-all back here at 1:30.

We conclude that none of the State's explanations reflect an inherently discriminatory intent. Appellant did not attempt to rebut the State's reasons. The trial court's finding that the State's explanations were gender-neutral is supported by the record and is not clearly erroneous.*fn42 We overrule appellant's ninth issue.

Having considered all of appellant's issues, they are all either overruled or waived. The judgment of the trial court is AFFIRMED.

LINDA REYNA YAÑEZ, Justice

Do not publish -- TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).

Opinion Footnotes *fn1 See TEX. PEN. CODE ANN.§ 22.02 (Vernon Supp. 2005).

*fn2 See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).

*fn3 "Serious bodily injury' means bodily injury that creates a substantial risk of death . . . or protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ." TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. § 1.07(46) (Vernon Supp. 2005).

*fn4 "Deadly weapon' means: . . . anything that in the manner of its use or intended use is capable of causing death or serious bodily injury." TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. § 1.07(a)(17)(B) (Vernon Supp. 2005).

*fn5 TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. § 22.02 (Vernon Supp. 2005).

*fn6 Escamilla v. State, 143 S.W.3d 814, 817 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) (citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)).

*fn7 See Malik v. State, 953 S.W.2d 234, 240 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997); Adi v. State, 94 S.W.3d 124, 131 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2002, pet. ref'd).

*fn8 Malik, 953 S.W.2d at 240.

*fn9 Booker v. State, 929 S.W.2d 57, 60 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1996, pet. ref'd).

*fn10 TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.04 (Vernon 1981); Chambers v. State, 805 S.W.2d 459, 461 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).

*fn11 Penagraph v. State, 623 S.W.2d 341, 343 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981).

*fn12 Escamilla, 143 S.W.3d at 817 (citing Zuniga v. State, 144 S.W.3d 477, 484-85 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004)).

*fn13 Johnson v. State, 23 S.W.3d 1, 10-12 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000).

*fn14 Id.

*fn15 Sims v. State, 90 S.W.3d 600, 603 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003).

*fn16 The standard of review applicable to the denial of a motion for directed verdict is the same as that applied in reviewing the legal sufficiency of the evidence. Williams v. State, 937 S.W.2d 479, 482 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996); Havard v. State, 800 S.W.2d 195, 199 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989). We view all the evidence presented during the guilt/innocence phase and if it is sufficient to support the verdict, the trial court did not err in overruling the motion for directed verdict. Madden v. State, 799 S.W.2d 683, 686 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990).

*fn17 See, e.g., Cooper v. State, 773 S.W.2d 749, 750 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1989, no writ) ("A fist or hand is not a deadly weapon per se, but it can become a deadly weapon in the manner used depending on the evidence shown.").

*fn18 See United States v. Mitchell, 166 F.3d 748, 753 (5th Cir. 1999).

*fn19 See TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. § 17.01(a)(46) (Vernon Supp. 2005) (defining "serious bodily injury").

*fn20 See TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. § 17.01(a)(17)(B) (Vernon Supp. 2005) (defining "deadly weapon").

*fn21 See Escamilla, 143 S.W.3d at 817.

*fn22 See TEX. R. EVID.403.

*fn23 See TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1;Blue v. State, 41 S.W.3d 129, 131 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000).

*fn24 The witness answered "yes" to both questions.

*fn25 See TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1;Blue, 41 S.W.3d at 131.

*fn26 See TEX. R. EVID.902(1), (2).

*fn27 An objection made at trial must mirror the contention on appeal or the point of error will be waived. See Santellan v. State, 939 S.W.2d 155, 171 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997); Doyle v. State, 24 S.W.3d 598, 602 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2000, pet. ref'd).

*fn28 See, e.g., Willis v. State, 785 S.W.2d 378, 383 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989).

*fn29 See Fritz v. State, 946 S.W.2d 844, 846 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997).

*fn30 Bausley v. State, 997 S.W.2d 313, 315 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1999, pet. ref'd).

*fn31 Id.

*fn32 Id.

*fn33 Simpson v. State, 119 S.W.3d 262, 268 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003); Sparks v.State, 68 S.W.3d 6, 11 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2001, pet. ref'd).

*fn34 Simpson, 119 S.W.3d at 268; Sparks, 68 S.W.3d at 11.

*fn35 Simpson, 119 S.W.3d at 268; Sparks, 68 S.W.3d at 11.

*fn36 Sparks, 68 S.W.3d at 11.

*fn37 Simpson, 119 S.W.3d at 268; Sparks, 68 S.W.3d at 11.

*fn38 Simpson, 119 S.W.3d at 268; Sparks, 68 S.W.3d at 11.

*fn39 Sparks, 68 S.W.3d at 11.

*fn40 Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 768 (1995).

*fn41 Specifically, the State gave the following reasons for striking the venire members:
Juror No. 9: "because he found not guilty in a defrauding the government case" and "seemed responsive to the defense counsel in the case."
Juror No. 10: "there had been an arrest for a DWI, and something about there had been a criminal jury but they didn't have a case."
Juror No. 13: "was a criminal juror in a rape case and found not guilty."
Juror No. 26: "seemed rather wishy-washy in his answers" and said "he'd rather not be here."
Juror No. 31: "had also worked for a criminal attorney, and the State was worried about her legal expertise."
Juror No. 32: "said that it really would be more appropriate in family court versus in criminal court of an aggravated assault when it's a domestic dispute."
Juror No. 33: "had been on a criminal jury. . . . an assault case, and the person was found not guilty."
Juror No. 40: "knows [defense counsel]" and "also raised a lot of concerns about guns and knives being deadly weapons."
Juror No. 45: "had had charges with a knife brought against him."
Juror No. 46: "had found not guilty on an assault case with an inmate who was charging a jailer."

*fn42 See Simpson, 119 S.W.3d at 268.

20060525

© 1992-2006 VersusLaw Inc.; Pat. Pending


Powered by VersusLaw, Inc.
Home | Advertise | About | Feedback | Terms | Privacy Policy | FAQ
All contents © Copyright 2008 - 2009 VersusLaw, Inc. Bellevue, WA, USA. All rights reserved